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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action involves a determination by the Industrial 
Commission that defendant-claimant Spackman had sustained a 
compensable industrial injury, which determination is contested 
by plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
This case was heard by an Industrial Commission 
administrative law judge on October 2, 1978, whereupon on October 
24, 1978 an order awarding defendant-claimant Spackman certain 
benefits was entered by the Commission. On November 6, 1978 an 
extention was granted for filing a motion for review and on 
November 13, 1978 a motion for review of the order of the 
Industrial Commission was filed. On November 28, 1978 the motion 
for review was denied by the Industrial Commission. A petition 
for writ of review was filed with this Court on December 8, 1978 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-83. 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
Plaintiff seeks to have this Court determine that 
defendant-claimant Spackman did not ~ustain a compensable injury 
under Utah workmen's Compensation Law, that the order of the 
Commission granting such compensation should be overturned, and 
tlat the claim of defendant-claimant Spackman should be denied in 
tt3 entir~ty. 
STATEMENT OF ~HE F~CTS 
On April S, 1978 defendant-claimant Spack~an was 
•Tc!~~~d on a part-tim~ bas1s in the dietary division of 
:,L,~t•f ~cKay Dee Hospl~31. o~rl,J a hal~ hour break in his 
-2-
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work on that day, defendant-claimant Spackman talked to his 
•uperviao~ with ~eqa~d to his wo~k schedule. As a result of the 
conve~•ation defendant-claimant Spackman became very angry. As a 
con•equence, afte~ leaving the supervisor's office he hit some 
ga~baqe can• and so•e boxes, and finally in a fit of anger hit 
80ae .. tal •winqinq doo~s with his fists knowing full well that 
the riqht door was locked. 
As a result of hitting the right locked metal door, 
defendant Spackman broke the little finger on his right hand. 
About two weeks after the cast had been put on the finger and 
while defendant Spackman was in bed, he was startled and hit a 
low ceiling overhead with his cast. This caused the pin which 
had been inserted at the time of the original casting of the 
finger to come out. Later some infection developed in the bone. 
After the last of some four or five subsequent casts on the 
finger had been removed, defendant Spackman was released to 
r~turn to work on August 16, 1978. 
ARGUME~T 
POINT I 
THE INJURY fOR WHICH DEFENDANT SPACKMAN SEEKS 
COMPENSATION WAS PURPOSELY SELF-INFLICTED. 
T~e definition of a compensable accident ~ithin the 
meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law of Utah r~quir~s that 
"the sa~e ~as not purposely sclf-1nfl1cted." Utah Code Ann. 
S 35-l-45. ~~e test1~ony i~ t~is cas~ 1s clear that i~ fact t~e 
1njury [or ~hie~ de~~ndant ~~a~~~ar1 s~~~ks r~~QV·~~y W3S :1Jr?~s~~::· 
or lntenti~)nail~' sel~-lnflt:::t~(i, -:-""Jere 1:~ ...,." ,~..!·~:-.;tJ.,,n t:~3.~ Jf'=~· 
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defendant Spackman left his supervisor he was very .. d. Ria 
hitting a garbage can and some boxes in the back rooa clearly 
demonstrates that he was taking out his anger by hitting things. 
Re did not stay in the back room very long but rather, continuing 
in anger, smashed his fist against the metal doors knowing lull 
well that the right metal door was not ever open but waa always 
kept locked. Defendant Spackman's own testimony best describes 
the situation: 
A: Well I was mad. I hit some garbage cans, 
I hit some boxes and garbage cans, and I went 
through the door mad. 
~: Just like -- Well I was mad. I went 
running out the doors, you know, and pushed 
the doors open, you know, in a very angry 
state. I pushed the doors open, and I hit 
the door. 
Transcript Page 10. 
Q: Okay, when you went through those metal 
doors, did you hit your fist against the 
metal doors, or was it with your open hand? 
A: It had to have been with my fist, because 
it got my knuckle. It wasn't -- Well, you 
know. It was both fists that I hit it with. 
Q: And that was in anger? You don't 
normally open the door that way? 
A: No, I don't normally open the door that 
way. 
Transcript Page 21. 
J: You hit the right door, --
,; : y" s. 
Q: -- t~at dtdn't move? 
; : '{ .-? s. 
-4-
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Qz You knew that that door was always locked 
though? 
A: Yea. 
Tranacript at Page 26. 
There ahould be no doubt that defendant Spackman's 
actiona in hitting a metal door with his fist after he had hit 
9arbage cana and boxes and while he was admittedly very mad can 
be clasaified aa a purposeful, self-inflicted injury, as that 
ter. is used in the Utah Workmen's Compensation Law. 
The award in this case by the Industrial Commission 
does not deny the anger of Mr. Spackman nor that he struck both 
doors in his anger. Rather the decision of the Industrial 
Ca.miasion is that •self injury other than suicide or injury from 
auicide attempt is not a defense• under the Utah Statute. 
Industrial Commission Order, October 24, 1978. In reaching that 
decision the admin1strative law judge cited two Utah cases. 
In the case of Sugar v. Industrial Commission, 94 Utah 
56, 75 P.2d 311 (1938) t~e court had before it the question of 
whether a deat~ ~as in fact suicidal. The court ~ade no 
determination whlc~ would exclude any other ~ind of self-
infltcted tnjury as a defense for purposes of Industrial 
Compensation recovery. Rather, the court jecided tn that c~se 
th~t since the de3t~ ~as sutcldal, ther~ could ~e no recove~y. 
P • 2 d 2 ll S , ( 1 9 4 6 1 , : ~ e c .1 .o •! j 1 d .~ .J t t ~ ·: o 1 ·: » 3 '1 1 :1 j '-' s ~ r 1 1 1 1 :1 J u r : 
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did not. That, however, does not mean that a defense of self-
inflicted injury is not a valid defense. It only means that 
there has to be good evidence on that point. One cannot rely 
only on evidence that there was an intentional or willful 
violation of a safety rule. 
The administrative law judge also relied on the noted 
treatise of Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, 
Volume I A, Section 36.50. Not only is that treatise misapplied 
in this case but it is also misquoted. The section involved 
says: "The defense of intentional self-injury, not apart fro• 
sui~ide, has produced virtually no law of significance.• 
!Epmphasis added). In citing that same provision in the order, 
the administrative law judge substituted the word "rule" for the 
underlined word "law.• 
In other words, Professor Larson does not suggest there 
is no rule allowing the defense of intentional self-injury to 
apply in cases not involving a suicide. Rather, he says there 
are very few cases on the subject. Professor Larson goes on to 
~xplain the reason, namely that the compensation levels for 
work~en's compensation are sufficiently low that most ~orkers 
Nould not intentionally injure themselves for the purpose of 
r~ce1~ing workers compensation benefits. 
T~e language of the statute is clear and courts must 
:J~st~~o languaq~ of a st3t~to to make it purposefJl and 
~ '' • 'c t t ; -e r 3 t '1 e r t!1 an : J t ll e 1 n d me 3 n i n -3 1 e 55 • Davis v • 
·,.;3cLn':>n Toll 'ln·lJ•? ;_,·~·)n':; 357 ?.2d 71) (\\ash. 1960). T"le 
-5-
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qualification to the clear langugage of the statute which would 
.ate it futile and .. aningless and certainly destroys the clear 
lantuage of the statute. As was stated in a recent Indiana case, 
the .. aning of •intentionally self-inflicted" is plain and 
una8biguoua, and •when the evidence suggests, and the Board finds 
that an e•ployee intentionally inflicted injury upon himself, 
co.penaation •uat be denied.• Henry v. Schenk Mechanical 
Contractors, Inc. 346 N.!.2d 616 (Ind. 1976). 
A good case in point is Carland v. Vance, 137 Pa. 
Super. 47, 10 A.2d 114 (1939), where the claimant working in a 
gasoline station had his trousers saturated with gasoline. On a 
dare, he struck a match and applied it to his trousers which 
caught fire, causing him injury. The court in that case denied 
the claim on the basis of both the self-inflicted injury as well 
as the tact that there was no accident. The court held that "the 
element of being unforeseen, something that is not expected or 
intended, result from an unknown cause, or an unusual effect of a 
known cause" was missing. Id. at 115. The court stated further: 
The claimant's own testimony conclusively 
shows that the result which followed his 
foolish act was expected. The inevitable and 
anticipated consequence of applying a match 
to material made inflammable by gasoline 
occurr'!d. 
Id. at 115. 
Ther-' ts no questtJn tn this case that ~'le clai,nant ltl 
I'1 t:-ns 
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case the court held that the claimant's injuries fro• a co-
worker's blows were the result of the claimant's willful 
intention to injure himself. The court held that the clai•ant in 
anger intended to provoke his co-worker with his remarks. The 
fact that he was injured by his co-worker came because of his own 
deliberate action. There was, said the court, •a reasonable 
expectation of bringing about a real injury to hi•self.• ~at 
260. 
The Industrial Commission has not cited a case nor does 
there appear to be a case which holds that the self-injury •ust 
~e suicidal in nature in order for it to be a defense. The fact 
that most self-injury cases which have come before the courts are 
suicidal in nature does not change the real intent of the 
language nor place any modifications on the same. The Industrial 
Commission was in error in determining that the self-inflicted 
injury defense applies only in the cases of suicide or attempted 
suicide. Therefore the decision of the Industrial Commission 
should be reversed and defendant Spackman's claim should be 
totally denied. 
POINT II 
----
SPACKMAN'S INJURY DID NOT COME 
I~ THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
~s has been outlined in the Statement of Facts of this 
>ls··, :lC>fe>ndar1t Spack:nan was clearly on his break during the 
~"t:r~ Pp1sode 1~vol~ed 1n this case. ~e was nei~~er discharging 
_' iu t 1>75 nor l·)l n::j some t'11n9 in some '-'3'! connected with or 
-3-
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door. See, Sullivan v. Industrial Comm., 79 Utah 317, 10 P.2d 
t2C (1932). Althouqh a temporary work atop will not by itself 
bar recovery, the injury has to be one to which the employee is 
••posed as an eaployee in his employment. California 
Caayalty lndea. !xch. v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 21 Cal.2d 461, 
132 P.2d 815 (19C2). 
In this particular case defendant Spackman would not 
noraally have been injured by going through the one door he used 
in the course of his employment. He testified, as cited above, 
that he did not normally smash both fists against the two doors 
at the same time since he knew that the right door was always 
locked. Hence, Spackman was not carrying out his duties as an 
eaployee and was engaged in an activity to which he would not 
normally be exposed as an employee at the time he injured 
himself. For that reason he should be denied compensation in 
this case. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS NO "ACCIDENT" INVOLVED IN THIS CASE AS 
THAT WORD IS DEFINED IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW. 
As was decided in a recent case before this Court, and 
as has been the rule of law in Utah throughout the life of 
workmens' compensation law, an "accident" for purposes of 
compensability must tnvolve an unanticipated, unintended 
occurrence different from what would normally be ~xpected to 
occur in the usual course of events. The Church of Jesus Chrtdt 
of Latter-day Sat~ts v. I~dustrtal Commisston, P.2d 
(Utah 1979); C:ulina ,. I~c1ustnal C)m.':1l.oston, 16 ·~·.2rl 2G•l, 3~9 
-9-
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P.2d 202 (1965). There was nothing unusual or unanticipated 
about the injury which occurred to defendant Spackman. Be 
purposely and intentionally hit his hand against a locked .. tal 
door. That he received a broken finger as a result is no .are an 
unusual result than in the Carland v. Vance case, supra, wbere 
the employee by igniting his pants soaked with gasoline received 
a rather bad burn. In both cases, there was injury but in both 
cases it was the very injury which one would anticipate or expect 
under the circumstances. The only surprising fact is that 
Spackman's hand was not more severely injured. 
POINT IV 
IF SPACKMAN IS TO BE AWARDED COMPENSATION, THE PERIOD OF 
TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY AND THE AMOUNT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES 
TO BE PAID SHOULD BE REDUCED. 
As noted in the Statement of the Facts in this case, 
within one week after the initial injury, defendant Spackman hit 
the ceiling of his room, causing additional injury to his finger. 
The act of hitting the ceiling was not secondary to the original 
tnjury but was a new intervening action. Therefore the period of 
r~covery as well as medical expenses connected with the prolonged 
r~covery, including the onset of infection, should not be charged 
3gatnst 9laintiff in this case. 
It should also be noted that the injury was only of the 
:t•tl~ ftnger. There is no evidence that ~ef~ndant Spackman 
-::·~'.rl n.Jt ..,ork wit'.1 t:1~ r~st of his uninjured body. 11oreover, 
J~~·nJant 3packman w1s going to school and had only ~een wor~ing 
"lrt-ttme for platntiEf. There is no evi1ence that he could not 
-10-
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qet soae other part-tiae job. Hence, except for perhaps a very 
short period, plaintiff should not be charged temporary total 
disability. 
SUMMARY 
There is no dispute in this case that the injury to 
defendant Spackaan came as a direct result of his expressing 
anqer by ••ashinq his fist against a locked metal door. That 
action constitutes an intentional self-inflicted injury clearly 
within the meaning of the law. There was no "accident• involved 
since the ensuing result was anticipated. Moreover, all of this 
took place during a lunch break period. Therefore, considering 
the nature of the activity Spack~an was involved in and the fact 
that he was not performing any service for his employer at the 
time of the injury, he was not injured in the course of his 
employment. 
Totaling everything u9, there is more than ample reason 
to find that defendant Spack~an was not entitled to any 
compensation for his injury of April 5, 1978. The Industrial 
Commission clearly misapplied the law in this case in so awarding 
compensatton. T~at award should be reversed by this Court and 
defendant Spackman's claim for compensation should be denied. 
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